The rest of this paper is organized as fol lows. Section II overviews the related work.
Section III describes the system model and the security model for VANETs. Section IV pres ents our security protocol. Followed by securi ty analysis and performance results in section V, the last part is our further discussions and conclusion in section VI.
II. REL ATED WORK
Generally, there are mainly four kinds of key agreement scheme so far, that is, the tradition al PKI-based or the Certificate (CA)-based key agreement schemes, the identification (ID) based key agreement schemes [5, 6] , or others, including the certificateless public key agree ment [2, 3] , the Lite-CA based key agreement schemes [4] , and the self-certificate public key based key agreement schemes. It is worth China Communications· September 2014 noting that CA-based key agreement scheme usually requires the attendance of a public key infrastructure. Besides that, the IO-based cryp tosystem [5] often exists a key escrow issue.
In 2005, AI-Riyami and Paterson [7] intro duced a certificate less public-key encryption (CL-PKE) that gets rid of the requirement of public key infrastructure. Roughly speaking, it combines the ideas and methods from the traditional public key encryption and identi ty-based encryption. Distinguished from 10-based cryptosystems, user's partial private key originates from its own identity information and KGC, and a secret value generated by the user itself. In 2008, Dent [ 8] , in one survey paper, notes that two obvious advantages of certificate less public key encryption scheme.
First, it has no requirement of certificates, which is unlike a traditional public key en cryption scheme. Furthermore, it voids the direct threat from attackers to compute the full private key.
In 2009, Lippold et al. [3] proposed the first one-round CL-AKE scheme proven secure in the random oracle model. This paper gives a detailed secure proof and a generic model to design a strong secure key agreement proto col. However, its process of key agreement is complex and time-consuming with at least five modular exponentiation and ten bilinear pairing operations. In 2011, Yang et al. [9] pro posed the first proven strongly secure CL-KE protocol without pairing. It requires less com putation cost than Lippold's scheme because of no expensive pairing operations. These cer tificateless key agreement schemes, in general, have three main secrets, that is, the ID-based key, the secret value and the ephemeral key.
Both papers use the random oracle model to prove their security that, as long as one of the three secrets is unrevealed, the scheme is con sidered secure [3, 9] . However, these studies are not feasible in securing V2V communica tion when considering of less computation and communication overhead.
Song et al. [2] proposed a strong certifi cateless key agreement protocol following a practical approach and fully addressing the VANET attacks. This scheme has four rounds to achieve the three-way handshake. Thus it is still inefficient for vehicle-to-vehicle key agreement communication. Dong and Cao [4] proposed an efficient lite-CA-based encryption scheme for data forwarding in VANETs. This proposed scheme has less computational over head and provides an efficient way to relieve workload and deployment of certificates as well.
Inspired by previous works, this paper pro poses a certificate less key agreement scheme which is addressed in a dynamic and insecure vehicular environment, particularly for V2V authentication communication in the scenario without available road-side infrastructures. There is usually only one RTA which is always trusted. In our system model, RTA has two main functions: one is that RTA computes the EphemeralKeyGen(1 k) : with the input of the security parameters k, it outputs the ephemeral key ri and Ri of user i.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURE
SessionKeyGen(sid, pki' pkj' ski, sk): with the input of the parameters sid, pki' pkj' sk;, skj, where sid is the identity of the session, pki is the set of user i's public keys, pkj is the set of user j's public keys, Ski is the set of user i's private keys, skj is the set of user j's private keys, the algorithm outputs the session key SK between user i and}. Reveal master key: by this query, A learns the master key s.
Reveal ID-based secret: by this query, A learns a user's ID-based key dm.
Reveal secret value: by this query, A learns a user's longterm secret key Xu. After the second phase, the adversary out puts a guess fj for b. If fj = b , we consider the adversary wins the game, and the advantage that the adversary wins the game is defined as:
IV. SECURITY PROTOCOL DESIGN
In this section, we propose the preliminaries for the certificateless key agreement scheme, and then design a lightweight certificateless key agreement scheme by using five following cryptographic primitives. It is noted that this scheme can be easily extended and further op timized by one kind of improvement design.
Finally, we present their proofs on consistency and security.
Preliminaries
Due to the page limit, we only review part of the definitions and theorems that are closely related to our proposed protocol.
Definition: Z; is multiplicative group, where q is a prime integer; G is a cyclic group of prime order q, generated by gEG; G' = G \ 1, where I is the identity ofG.
Com putational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem: [12] given g", g " E G , where
Cap Diffi e-Hellman (CDH) Problem: [1 3] given g", g " ,g" E G', where a,b,c � Zq, it's easy to decide whether c=ab, but cannot com pute a, b.
Cap Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Signature:
let secret key x � Zq', the public key v = g" given x and a message ME to, I}" compute h = H(M), and the signature a = hX , where
The verification is to com pute h = H(M), and verify that (g, v, h, a) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple.
Dual (exponential) Challenge-Response (DCR) signature: [14] let public keys A = g a and X = gX, B = g " and Y = g. The OCR signature (OS) of A and B on message ml, m2 is a tuple of values X, Y , and DS A 'B' re spectively. Here, the same signature can be exchanged to compute (and verify) as follows:
+eb , where d and e denote H(X , ml) and
Twin Diffi e-Hellman (TDH) Trapdoor The orems: [1 3] using the above notations, suppose
random variables in G and defined as functions of Xl and X2• Then, I) X2 is uniformly distributed over G; 2) Xl and X2 are indepen dent; 3) if Xj = g" and Xc = g", the probability that the value of Z � Z 2 = Y ' does not agree with the value of Zj = yx, 1\ Z 2 = yxo is at most I/q (if the latter holds, the former certainly holds).
Protocol design
In this section, we present a concrete cer tificateless key agreement scheme for V2V 
I'H1(A)H](B) ,A 7 = g sH](A)H,(B)
So the session key SK is: S K = H 2 (S id, A" A 2 , A3, A4, As, Ao, A7)
As mentioned above, we show a proposed certificateless key agreement process, which fits for Lippold's secure model [3] . Further more, this proposed scheme computes more easily and keeps minimization principle from the cryptography primitives.
v. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PERFORMANCE RESULTS
In this section, we demonstrate that the pro posed protocol is secure, practical and feasible by analyzing its security properties, computa tional cost and communication overhead.
Security analysis
We first prove that the proposed certificateless Test(ITi, ' j): the input session is fresh [3] , and a bit b E { 0, I} is randomly chosen. If b = 0, the adversary A learns the session key SK, otherwise it randomly chooses a session key from the set of valid session keys for A.
We say that our certificate less authentica tion key agreement scheme is secure if for any PPT adversary A to guess b for 'jj , the advan tage A breaks up our scheme is a negligible function of k, which we denote as: Where, q is the most of users, and q' is the most sessions.
So, the probability of B choosing the right i, J is:
and then the probability of guess the IT i, ' j cor rectly is:
Since there are three secrets (drm Xu, ru)
kept in each party, we say that our scheme is secure as long as there is still one se cret unrevealed for each party. So there are 9 situations that each party still keeps one secret. For the 9 situations, there are 9 strategies for B to abort the game, il lustrated in Table I x'/xu
� � 
Performance results
In this section, we will evaluate our proposed certificateless key agreement scheme from the aspect of efficiency and network performance. Table II .
1) Efficiency Analysis:
The experiment platform used in this pa per is a commodity PC with a dual-core 3.4 GHz CPU, and 2 GB RAM, and we used the In Figure 5 , the y-axis indicates the pack age delivery rate, which means the ratio of the number of delivered data packet to the desti nation. This illustrates the level of delivered data to the destination. 
From Figure 5 , we can see that the three curves are very similar, and they are nearly overlapped. Therefor, the proposed scheme does not decrease the packet delivery rate and does not add much network overhead.
[n Figure 6 , the y-axis indicates the end- I arrivetime -sendtime
I Numberofconnections
From Figure 6 , we can see that the pro posed scheme increases a little extra end-to end delay, but the addition in E2ED is negli gible because the three curves are quite close.
We can conclude that our proposed certificate less key agreement scheme is efficient which shows a good network performance.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
[n this paper, we focus on a practical and safe 
